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Abstract
Television (or “TV”) broadcasting today is in the wake of a critical technological revolution.
The development of new technologies is becoming increasingly rapid and the legal scenario is
changing daily and sometimes disorganically. Regulation in this field is strictly connected with
technology and its evolution. For this reason, it is worthwhile to go through a brief outline of
the last and most significant television broadcasting techniques. Distribution of TV “signals”
has occurred in Europe and especially in Italy — until the beginning of the present decade —
almost exclusively through terrestrial networks, i.e. via etere. This situation means that in order
to admit new television broadcasters, it becomes necessary to utilize new channels of distribution.
The new “frontiers” of television broadcasting concern both the channels of distribution properly
considered and the “quality” of the TV signals. As far as the quality of the television signal is
concerned, analog transmission is going to be replaced by digital signals that permit not only the
saving of precious frequencies, but also the granting of an interactive, higher quality-grade signal.
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INTRODUCTION'
Television (or "TV") broadcasting today is in the wake of a
critical technological revolution. The development of new technologies is becoming increasingly rapid and the legal scenario is
changing daily and sometimes disorganically. Regulation in this
field is strictly connected with technology and its evolution. For
this reason, it is worthwhile to go through a brief outline of the
last and most significant television broadcasting techniques.
Distribution of TV "signals" has occurred in Europe and especially in Italy-until the beginning of the present decadealmost exclusively through terrestrial networks, i.e. via etere. As
known, terrestrial frequencies are scarce and, therefore, this
kind of distribution does not allow to "gain" and "occupy" new
frequencies. This situation means that in order to admit new
television broadcasters, it becomes necessary to utilize new channels of distribution.
The new "frontiers" of television broadcasting concern both
the channels of distribution properly considered and the "quality" of the TV signals. In the first sense, alternative and most
convenient distribution channels are: (i) cable distribution
channels, which are not sufficiently developed in Italy, and in
Europe in general-for historical reasons-in order to be a real* Partner, Antonelli & Cocuzza, Studio Legale Associato, Milan.
1. Suggested readings on new television techniques and Italian legislative scenario
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STATI TICAL YEARBOOK OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1998); V. Zeno-Zencovich, I sistema
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approach, Corn (97), 623 Brussels, 03.12.1997; A. Contaldo, Profili giuridici della
piattaformadigitale, Dirrro D. AuTroRE 3 (1998).
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istic alternative to terrestrial distribution, and (ii) satellite network distribution, which has had a significant growth during the
last few years. Both aforementioned distribution channels allow
broadcasters to acquire new frequencies because of their need of
a narrower "space" for their transmissions.
As far as the quality of the television signal is concerned,
analog transmission is going to be replaced by digital signals that
permit not only the saving of precious frequencies, but also the
granting of an interactive, higher quality-grade signal. This
revolution concerns not only the techniques of broadcasting of
TV signals, but also-and above all-the reception of the transmissions by the television audience. The distinction here is
drawn between free-on-air televisions, both state-owned and private, and pay-TVs. In the latter case, the reception of the programs is not free and the audience, or better, the "subscribers,"
need to pay a fee in order to receive the transmissions. Pay-TVs
are in general "thematic," i.e., they provide for the broadcasting
of a particular and specific kind of transmission, such as films,
sports, etc.
I. ECONOMIC TRENDS CHARACTERIZING THE
MEDIA MARKET 2
Here are some essential features of the Italian scenario: Italy has more than twenty million households, and a very high
penetration rate of TV stations. It is the fourth largest European
television market, and-this statistic is a key element-RAI and
Mediaset 3 are basically attracting more than ninety percent of
2. Suggested readings on economic issues concerning the development of
television and media markets, see generally C. Dematti & F. Perretti, Digital Television:
European Groupings Push into the Market, SCREEN DIGEST, Oct. 1997, at 225; GAMBARO &
RICCIARDI, ECONOMIA DELL 'INFORMAZIONE E DELLA COMUNICAIZONE (Roma, 1997); R.
Wood, TV digitale terrestre: meglio dare tanti canali o rilanciarel'alta definizione?, MIND, Jan.

1997, at 7; John Temple Lang, Media, Multimedia and European Community Antitrust Law,
in 1997 FoR)HAm Corn'. L. INST., 377 (Barry Hawk ed., 1998); F. Perretti, Strategie
internazionali delle imprese televisive, PROBLEMI DELL 'IMFORMAZIONE, June 1995, at 205;
Preta, Come cambia la televisione: dal 'broadcasting" al "video-on-demand", PROBLEMI DELL
IMFORMAZIONE, June 1994, at 145; B. OLi, LA FINE DELLA COMUNICAZIONE DI MASSA
(Bologna, 1997); M. MIccIo & M. MELE, BREvE GUIDA ALIA LEGGE MACANico, LE
TELEVISIONI DEL FUTURO (Milano, 1997); A-M. Wachtmeister, Broadcastingof Sports Events
and Competition Law, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSLETTER, June 1998.

3. RAI is state-owned and Mediaset is ultimately controlled by the Media tycoon
Silvio Berlusconi.
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the audience. So, as to free-on-air television, there is a duopolistic situation.
The Italian pay-TV market is still modestly developed with
just two channels presently operating: i) Telepiai, which is controlled by Canal Plus, the French pay-TV giant, and ii) Stream,
which recently began its activity, is owned by Telecom, the recently privatized Italian telephone company. Moreover, Italy has
the lowest penetration rate in Europe for cable and satellite, and
the pay-TV market has only 4.8% of the total share. It is evident,
after a brief analysis of the actual scenario, that a few players are
dominating the market. This fact obviously provokes important
antitrust responses.
The worldwide trend, increasing especially from 1994 to
1996, is strongly characterized by mergers, acquisitions, and integration among the TV and media industries. Few players are
dominating the market-top players being merged companies-and the ten largest media companies basically control almost half of the worldwide media market. Media operators and
televisions are also expanding into downstream or upstream
markets, into lateral markets, and into markets that are either up
or down their original core business. A clear example of this
trend is Time Warner, which is a fully integrated company from
cinema to press, going from cable to music, video, and TV.
Within the realm of such "value of chain" driven vertical integration, pay-TV, digital, and cable TV are growing faster than any
other segment in the media sector.

II. ITALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK: THE MACCANICO LAW 4AND THE
NEW ANTITRUST PROVISIONS
1997 has been a crucial year for Italy in this specific sector.
On July 31, 1997, after a long parliamentary debate, the new radio-television discipline-containing ad hoc antitrust provi4. Suggested readings on Italian legislative frame and on the recently enforced
antitrust legislation, see generally V. Di STEFANO, 1A LIBERALIZZAZIONE DELLE
TELECOMUNICAZIONI (Milano, 1997); Mario Siragusa, Competition and the Guarantee of
Pluralism of Information in the Recent Italian Television BroadcastingRegulation, in 1997
FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST., 525 (Barry Hawk ed., 1991); P. Fattori, Brevi note sulla
ripartizionedi competenze tra Autoritd Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato e Autoritd per le
Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, CONCORRENZA E MERCATO 483 (1998); L'INDUSTRIA DELLA
COMUNICAZIONE IN ITALIA (Torino, 1997).
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sions-had been finally enacted. This enactment, Law No. 249/
97, is also referred to as the Maccanico Law,5 from the name of
the minister of the Telecommunications Ministry who proposed
it. Often inconsistent with previous legislation that was complicated and unclear, the Maccanico Law copes-inter alia-with
competition law issues and the need to guarantee pluralism.
Italian legislators tried to resolve these striking issues by creating a new and independent authority whose aim is of regulating and controlling the media market, and avoiding the creation
and the permanence of "dominant positions." The peculiar
composition of this authority, however-which became effective
as of Fall 1998 and which is named Autoritd per le garanzie nelle
comunicazioni ("Authority")-creates serious doubts on the impartiality of its approach. Its members, in fact, are chosen by the
Italian Parliament and mirror the political fragmentation of Italy's political system.
As said, the Authority's aim is to monitor competition
within media markets. Article 2 of the Maccanico Law in fact
bans all dominant positions in the broadcasting sector.6 The
striking importance of this provision must be stressed: a total
ban of any dominant position, independent from the way in
which it has been reached, and a ban which remains effective
even in case of spontaneous growth, which is rather unusual and
is not provided for by any European Community (or "EC") treaty
and most national competition law. Italian legislators intended,
therefore, to set significantly high antitrust thresholds in order
to create a situation of perfect pluralism in which nobody could
be "dominant."
The choice of protecting media pluralism by means of an
antitrust rule is rather unusual: one could argue whether antitrust has something to do with pluralism, or whether antitrust
and competition law are indeed appropriate tools for controlling and guaranteeing both the pluralism of messages and the
pluralism of broadcasters. From a legal viewpoint, these two aspects should remain distinct, as competition and pluralism belong to different areas of the law. Safeguarding pluralism involves constitutional rights of individuals-such as the freedom
of thought and the freedom of expression-which deserve a
5. L. 31.7.1997 n°249, in Gazz. Uff. 31.7.1997 n*177, S.O.
6. Id. art. 2.
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higher level of protection and which should not be submitted to
the defense of economic interests such as fair competition. Indubitably, however, pluralism and competition in media markets
have many elements in common. Sometimes, it is difficult to
draw the exact boundaries between one and the other.
Another important aspect of Article 2 of the Maccanico Law
that creates uncertainty is that it is unclear whether the dominant position recurs only when the thresholds indicated in the
law are triggered or if, indeed, the thresholds are only indicative
and may be interpreted by the Authority with a certain degree of
flexibility when assessing a dominant position. This distinction
is-in practice-a crucial issue because the answer to this question is essential in order to decide whether a commercial agreement or a simple position may be judged "dominant" per se or
whether a significant margin for interpretation and application
is left to the Authority.
The Authority is also competent to adopt the frequencies
allocation plan ("Piano Nazionale di Assegnazione delle Frequenze"),
which basically determines the quantity of "channels" that are
available for terrestrial broadcasting throughout the Italian territory. The Authority issued such a plan on October 30, 1998 and
it finally assigned to broadcasters eleven terrestrial channels.
This plan means that pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 6 of the
Maccanico Law,7 which sets forth antitrust thresholds, each
broadcaster is allowed to own no more than two channels broadcasting via etere. As a result of the enforcement of the plan, on
January 31, 1999, broadcasters owning more than two channels,
i.e., both RAI and Mediaset, are obliged to begin "simulcasting,"
i.e., a contemporary broadcasting of the exceeding channel both
on satellite and via etere. After this temporary period-in a successive deadline that will be determined by the Authority-exceeding channels shall definitively "leave" terrestrial distribution
and will exclusively utilize satellite channels of distribution.
Once again, the Maccanico Law establishes and sets forth an important set of rules aimed at ensuring pluralism via pure antitrust rules.
From a procedural point of view, the Maccanico Law provides for a dual notification system that creates substantial
problems. The law provides that any agreement or concentra7. Id.
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tion falling under the thresholds of the new antitrust legislation
needs to be notified to both authorities: the Antitrust Authority,
which is the public authority competent for the protection and
enforcement of general competition rules, and the Authority,
which is-as said above-the new authority created ad hoc by the
Maccanico Law for the safeguard of competition within the television market. Such striking duplication creates confusion because under Italian antitrust law, the notification of agreements
and mergers becomes compulsory only if some specific and predetermined thresholds are triggered. The result is that in certain cases under the new provisions of the Maccanico Law, the
notification of the agreement would be necessary, but under antitrust law, the same agreements would not need to be notified.
The Maccanico Law antitrust threshold focuses on the maximum amount of frequencies assigned to single national terrestrial broadcasters and the related amount of channels owned by
each of them. A threshold of greater significance focuses on the
collection of revenues calculated as a percentage of the aggregate national "resources" for both terrestrial and encrypted
broadcasting. Such percentage must not exceed thirty percent
of the total resources of the TV area. "Resources" comprehends
all revenues from the financing of public service, advertising,
telesales, and sponsoring agreements with public entities and
pay-TV subscriptions.
In case of antitrust violations, the Authority has the power
to issue economic sanctions to violators and it may also prohibit
the illegitimate behavior, the non-competition agreement, or
the banned dominant position. The scope of the Authority also
concerns the issuance of TV and radio licenses and their enrolling and the maintenance of a national register of media and telecommunication companies. National and local licenses are
granted for a renewable six year term. No broadcaster may be
granted more than one national license for encrypted transmissions. Such rigid limitations will be effective as of the date that is
going to be indicated by the Authority-after January 31, 1999,
pay-TV players shall begin the broadcasting in simulcast.
In conclusion, the new telecommunications legislative
framework, which has recently entered into force in Italy, has
been introduced as a new "segment" of antitrust provisions applied to the media market. Competition and pluralism are-for
certain aspects-jointly regulated and they are part of an overlap
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of rules that shall be difficult for lawyers and economic players to
cope.
III. "RELEVANT MARKET" DEFINITION FOR TELEVISION:
THE COMMUNITY AMD NATIONAL APPROACH8
The Maccanico Law does not provide for a legislative "market definition" of TV "products," and therefore-for antitrust
purposes and in order to correctly foresee the results in case of
enforcement of the law-it is necessary to examine how Italian
and European antitrust case law brings about the process of defining such a relevant market. On December 1997, the European Commission ("Commission") issued a Notice on the methodology that shall be utilized in the case of a definition of a relevant market for the purposes of European Community
competition law. Also, the Italian Antitrust Authority proposed,
in April 1996, a clear definition of the criteria that are to be used
in order to determine the relevant market. The importance of a
clear and correct determination of the methodology used by antitrust authorities in the definition of relevant markets is-in a
certain sense-strategic. In fact, violations of the antitrust rules
occur only if the behavior or the agreement of the companies at
stake triggers the thresholds or the prohibitions provided by the
law in a specific market and can be considered "relevant" for
antitrust purposes.
Leaving alone relevant geographic markets, whose definition is less difficult, relevant product markets have been defined
by both European and Italian antitrust authorities as the markets
that comprise all those products/services that are regarded as
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of
the products' characteristics, their prices, and their intended
use. Suppliers who operate within a specified market are there8. Suggested readings on market definition, see generally Commission Notice on
the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of the Community competition
law, O.J. C 372, 09.12.1997; M. Furse, Market Definition-TheDraft Commission Notice, 18
EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REv. 378 (1997); KS. Desau, The European Commission'sDraft
Notice on Market Definition: A Brief Guide to the Economics, EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV.
473 (Oct. 1997); S. Baker & L. Wu, Applying the Market Definition Guidelines of the
European Commission, EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REv. 273 (June 1998); G. BRUZZONE,
AuroRrrA
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fore subject to an aspect of competitive constraints that is particularly strong: demand substitutability. This approach implies
that, starting from the type of products that the involved players
sell and the area in which they sell them, additional products
and areas will be included into or excluded from the market definition depending on whether competition from these other
products and areas sufficiently affects or restrains the pricing of
the parties' products in the short term. In other words, it is necessary to establish whether the customers would switch to readily
available substitutes as an answer to a hypothetical semi-permanent price increase in the products and areas being considered.
Demand substitutability is therefore the prevailing criterion
used by antitrust authorities in order to frame relevant product
markets. In light of the above, it is now important-for antitrust
purposes-to understand if the product substitution principle
has been respected by antitrust authorities when defining the
relevant television market. The answer to such a crucial question is unfortunately negative. Case law reveals that relevant television markets have been defined as setting aside the criterion of
demand substitutability.
Such discrepancy between the declared and assessed criteria
and their practical enforcement is difficult to explain, and it may
be clearly perceived in the Commission's judgement in MSG
Mediaservice.9 In this case, the Commission decided that the considered relevant markets are the markets of free-on-the-air TV
and pay-TV-the former absolutely separate from the latter.
The distinction depends on the following criterion: the relevant
market is qualified by virtue of the "principal economic relationship" that, in the Commission's opinion, characterizes TV products. The Commission asserts that the pitting of pay-TV versus
free-on-the-air TV is due to the fact that the principal economic
relationship in free-TV is between TV providers and advertisers.
The distinction therefore depends on a presumed prevailing economic relationship. On the contrary, in pay-TV, the key
economic relationship is between TV and TV viewers. Is the demand substitutability "main-stream" criterion completely forgotten? The Commission does not justify its change of perspective.
The rationale of this decision has been further confirmed in the
9. Commission Decision No. 94/922/EEC, OJ. L 364/1 (1994) (MSG Media Service).
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RTL-Veronica 1° judgment and therefore it is possible to affirm
that this is the prevalent trend in the Commission's case law.
The Italian Antitrust Authority has adopted the same criterion of interpretation in the few cases that it has examined. TV
markets have been identified pursuant the prevailing economic
relationship definition principle. It is difficult to agree with this
approach considering the real attitude of consumers: for them,
in a plurality of cases, going to a movie theatre, watching a freeTV movie on commercial television, or paying a price to the
video rental shop or to the pay-per-view operator often is the
same thing. For consumers, all these products might be deemed
to be substitutable for each other, comprising, therefore, a unitarian market.

10. Commission Decision No. 96/346/EEC, O.J. L 134/32 (1996) (RTL/Veronica/Endemol).

